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Craddock for PMSA's lost cargo. The Coun of Appeals held "each assured would have liability
coverage for the loss of another's cargo, including another insured, but would not· have coverage
for the loss of its own cargo."
The Court of Appeals also had to decide what amount of damages Craddock was enntled
to receive from Wilson, who had negligently canceled his P&I policy. Under the canceled policy
Craddock was entitled to receive $250 per package, or in case of goods not shipped in packages.
per customary freight unit. The district court found the fish meal processing plant was not shtpped
in packages, which was not disputed upon appeal. Therefore, the computation of damages
centered upon the parties' meaning of customary freight unit. 'Customary freight untt' ts a term
of art found in the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA) §§ 1 et seq., 1 (c), 46 USC:\ §§
1300 et seq., 1301 (c). In General Motors Corp. v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 451 F :d :�. :5
(2d Cir. 1971), the court held that the customary freight unit represents not the shippmg umt. but
the unit of cargo "customarily used as the basis for the calculation of the freight rate to be
charged." Thus, the court herein held that in order to ascertain the meaning of the customary
freight unit in the shipping contract, it must look to the intentions of the parties as ev1denced m
the bills of lading, applicable tariffs, and the freight rates charged.
Wilson argued that the freight rate that Craddock charged PMSA was based upon the
transportation of the entire plant as one unit under a flat rate. Therefore, the plant ttself was the
customary freight unit. Craddock and PMSA argued that the freight rate was based upon �% of
the plant's value, therefore, making the customary freight unit the U.S. dollar. The court exammed
the bills of lading under which the plant was shipped and noted each bill listed vanous pans of
the plant. However, the bills consistently stated a lump sum freight charge and were not computed
on a percentage of the value of the plant shipped. As a result, the court held that the ennre plant
was the customary freight unit and that Wilson's liability to Craddock was limited to S250 for the
entire $1.7 million dollar plant.
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VESSEL OWNERS, STEVEDORES A�D LONGSHOREMEN MUST BEWARE OF
DEFECTS SURROI:::'IIDING THE WORK ZONE
When a vessel owner provides equipment for use by longshoremen, obvious ddrcts must
be reported and be of sufficient cause to cease operations. Otherwise, continurd usr by
longshoremen will result in release of vessel owner liability for the existing ddects.

F.3d 1239 (5th Cir. 1997)
(Decided April 28, 1997)

CK. Greenwood. v. Societe Francis De. Ill

On April 1, 1986, Societe Francaise De and Indian Ocean Boat Carriers, defendants and
shipowners of the MN PENAVAL, turned their vessel over to a stevedore whose responsibility
it was to employ longshoremen to unload the vessel. The operation of unloading the vessel. which
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occurred over a three day period, was carried out with no input from the ship's crew. On the first
day of unloading, a crane operated by one of the longshoremen, malfunctioned due to an obvious
problem with the crane's slewing brake. The malfunction in the crane resulted in its moving too
far in a horizontal direction, causing one of the cargo hooks to strike a longshoreman in the face.
�o report of this injury was made to the vessel owner and the longshoremen continued to use the
crane. Later in the day the same crane developed a problem with the boom brake, which controls
vertical movement. Once this problem was discovered, the crew shut down the crane for repairs.
After the repairs were made, the crew used the crane throughout the duration of the unloading
process. Soon after, this action was brought by the longshoreman to recover damages from the
vessel owner.
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas entered judgment for
the longshoreman. On appeal, however, the decision was reversed. The Court of Appeals
considered the issue of when it should become obvious to a shipowner that a stevedore's judg
ment, based on its specialized knowledge, is obviously improvident or dangerous. The court
considered the fact that even though the shipowner knew of the defect, it was also obvious to the
stevedore, who allowed the crane to be used, as well as to the longshoremen.
The court herein applied §5(b) of the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act
which states, ''the primary responsibility for the safety of the longshoremen rests upon the
stevedore." However, vessel owner liability may still arise in three instances:
1)
if the vessel owner fails to warn on turning over the ship of hidden defects of which he
should have known.
2)

for injury caused by hazards under the control of the ship.

3)
if the vessel owner fails to intervene in the stevedore's operations when he has actual
knowledge both of the hazard and that the stev�dore, in the exercise of 'obviously improvident'
judgement, intends to continue working despite the hazard and therefore cannot be relied on to
remedy it.
Regardless of the above, however, if the defect is open and obvious to the longshoreman,
then there is no breach of duty on the vessel owner's behalf. However, if the longshoremen's
only alternative proved to be impracticable or time-consuming then the vessel owner can still be
held liable. In this instance, any necessary repairs to the crane only required the longshoremen
to shut it down, during which time they would still have received compensation. This alternative
was not deemed to be impracticable by the Court of Appeals. Therefore, because the stevedore
failed to show that the shipowner had both actual knowledge of the existing defect and that the
stevedore intended to continue using the item with the defect, which if left unremedied posed a
substantial risk of harm, the Court of Appeals reversed the lower court decision and found in
favor of the vessel owner.
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